Earning Power: A Key Concept in Business Analysis and Investing

“…the phrase “earning power” must imply a fairly confident expectation of certain future results. It is not sufficient to know what the past earnings have averaged, or even that they disclose a definite line of growth or decline.” ―Graham & Dodd, Security Analysis (6th Ed.)

Earning Power and Buffett’s 2015 Shareholder Letter

The concept of earning power was mentioned five times by Warren Buffett in his 2015 shareholder letter. It first appears on page four in Buffett’s review of the highlights of the year at Berkshire (emphasis added).

Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power to increase every year. (Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will be small; at other times they will be material. L

The second time Buffett talks about earning power in his discussion about Precision Castparts Corp., an acquisition that closed in the beginning of 2016.

Next year, I will be discussing the “Powerhouse Six.” The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than $32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power.

The third time earning power is mentioned by Buffett is on connection to how future managers will proceed to build Berkshire’s intrinsic value.

Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.

The fourth time is when Buffett discusses the importance of long-term debt as a founding source for the long-lived and regulated assets that Berkshire’s regulated, capital-intensive businesses own.

A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/ interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)

The fifth, and last, time that earning power occurs is in connection to Buffetts discussion about how Berkshire managers think about how to grow their different businesses and adapt to changing circumstances in the competitive landscape.

Every day Berkshire managers are thinking about how they can better compete in an always-changing world. Just as vigorously, Charlie and I focus on where a steady stream of funds should be deployed. In that respect, we possess a major advantage over one-industry companies, whose options are far more limited. I firmly believe that Berkshire has the money, talent and culture to plow through the sort of adversities I’ve itemized above – and many more – and to emerge with ever-greater earning power.

So, Buffett clearly seems to focus on earning power as a highly important concept when it comes to looking at the different businesses in Berkshire’s possession. From having read the above quotations from the most recent shareholder letter, let’s have a closer look at the concept of earning power, and why it’s important to know be familiar with it.

The Power In “Earning Power”

In The Aggressive Conservative Investor Marty Whitman discusses the importance and implications of distinguishing between earnings and earning power.

Given the varied economic definitions of earnings, it may be wise to distinguish between earnings and earning power. By “earnings” is meant only reported accounting earnings. On the other hand, in referring to “earning power” the stress is on wealth creation. There is no need to equate a past earnings record with earning power. There is no a priori reason to view accounting earnings as the best indicator of earning power. Among other things, the amount of resources in the business at a given moment may be as good or a better indicator of earning power.

Graham & Dodd also put down their thoughts on earning power, for instance in Security Analysis (quotation below from the sixth edition).

Intrinsic Value vs. Price. From the foregoing examples it will be seen that the work of the securities analyst is not without concrete results of considerable practical value, and that it is applicable to a wide variety of situations. In all of these instances he appears to be concerned with the intrinsic value of the security and more particularly with the discovery of discrepancies between the intrinsic value and the market price. We must recognize, however, that intrinsic value is an elusive concept. In general terms it is understood to be that value which is justified by the facts, e.g., the assets, earnings, dividends, definite prospects, as distinct, let us say, from market quotations established by artificial manipulation or distorted by psychological excesses. But it is a great mistake to imagine that intrinsic value is as definite and as determinable as is the market price. Some time ago intrinsic value (in the case of a common stock) was thought to be about the same thing as “book value,” i.e., it was equal to the net assets of the business, fairly priced. This view of intrinsic value was quite definite, but it proved almost worthless as a practical matter because neither the average earnings nor the average market price evinced any tendency to be governed by the book value. 

Intrinsic Value and “Earning Power.” Hence this idea was superseded by a newer view, viz., that the intrinsic value of a business was determined by its earning power. But the phrase “earning power” must imply a fairly confident expectation of certain future results. It is not sufficient to know what the past earnings have averaged, or even that they disclose a definite line of growth or decline. There must be plausible grounds for believing that this average or this trend is a dependable guide to the future. Experience has shown only too forcibly that in many instances this is far from true. This means that the concept of “earning power,” expressed as a definite figure, and the derived concept of intrinsic value, as something equally definite and ascertainable, cannot be safely accepted as a general premise of security analysis.

Example: To make this reasoning clearer, let us consider a concrete and typical example. What would we mean by the intrinsic value of J. I. Case Company common, as analyzed, say, early in 1933? The market price was $30; the asset value per share was $176; no dividend was being paid; the average earnings for ten years had been $9.50 per share; the results for 1932 had shown a deficit of $17 per share. If we followed a customary method of appraisal, we might take the average earnings per share of common for ten years, multiply this average by ten, and arrive at an intrinsic value of $95. But let us examine the individual figures which make up this ten-year average. They are as shown in the table on page 66. The average of $9.50 is obviously nothing more than an arithmetical resultant from ten unrelated figures. It can hardly be urged that this average is in any way representative of typical conditions in the past or representative of what may be expected in the future. Hence any figure of “real” or intrinsic value derived from this average must be characterized as equally accidental or artificial.

Warren Buffett: Earning Power Our Annual Goal

Today Buffett appeared on CNBC where he was interviewed by Becky Quick. One of the topics they talked about was earning power.

Becky Quick: Well, let’s start off talking with just the report itself in terms of how the businesses are doing. It was a strong year, profit was up sharply. How would you just state the overall business is doing right now?

Warren Buffett: Well most of the businesses did pretty well last year. And our goal is to add to the fundamental earning power every year. That doesn’t mean we think that earnings will go up every year, because sometimes you’ll be in recession or something of the sort. But we wanna feel at the end of the year we got more fundamental earning power on an average basis going forward than the start of the year. And since we retain all our earnings we ought to do that, it’s kind of silly to retain earnings just to stay flat. So every year, last year we were able to add a couple important businesses. They didn’t actually get done till after the year-end. And they will add to our earning power, and then we try to develop further the earning power of the businesses we already have, and that’s the goal year after year.

Becky Quick: The big addition for this year will be Precision Castparts.

Warren Buffett: Yeah, it didn’t close until about a month after the end of the year.

Becky Quick: You talk about the powerhouse five.

Warren Buffett: Yeah, now we’re gonna have the powerhouse six. And someday we’ll have the powerhouse eighty I hope.

Click image below to watch the interview.

WB_CNBC1

S&P Earnings May Be Worse Than Advertised

Last Friday Herb Greenberg, Pacific Square Research, shared his perspective to why S&P earnings from 2015 may be worse than reported. Click image below to watch the interview.

Herb_earnings

Disclosure: I have a position in the BRK.B stock mentioned. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with the company. This article is informational and is in my own personal opinion. Always do your own due diligence and contact a financial professional before executing any trades or investments. 

 

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Distinguishing Between Earnings and Earning Power

“…the phrase “earning power” must imply a fairly confident expectation of certain future results. It is not sufficient to know what the past earnings have averaged, or even that they disclose a definite line of growth or decline.” ―Graham & Dodd, Security Analysis (6th Ed.)

A few thoughts from Graham & Dodd and Marty Whitman about how to think about earnings and how it may differ from earning power.

In The Aggressive Conservative Investor Marty Whitman discusses the importance and implications of distinguishing between earnings and earning power:

Given the varied economic definitions of earnings, it may be wise to distinguish between earnings and earning power. By “earnings” is meant only reported accounting earnings. On the other hand, in referring to “earning power” the stress is on wealth creation. There is no need to equate a past earnings record with earning power. There is no a priori reason to view accounting earnings as the best indicator of earning power. Among other things, the amount of resources in the business at a given moment may be as good or a better indicator of earning power.

Graham & Dodd also put down their thoughts about earning power, for instance in Security Analysis (quotation below from the sixth edition) in which they wrote:

Intrinsic Value vs. Price. From the foregoing examples it will be seen that the work of the securities analyst is not without concrete results of considerable practical value, and that it is applicable to a wide variety of situations. In all of these instances he appears to be concerned with the intrinsic value of the security and more particularly with the discovery of discrepancies between the intrinsic value and the market price. We must recognize, however, that intrinsic value is an elusive concept. In general terms it is understood to be that value which is justified by the facts, e.g., the assets, earnings, dividends, definite prospects, as distinct, let us say, from market quotations established by artificial manipulation or distorted by psychological excesses. But it is a great mistake to imagine that intrinsic value is as definite and as determinable as is the market price. Some time ago intrinsic value (in the case of a common stock) was thought to be about the same thing as “book value,” i.e., it was equal to the net assets of the business, fairly priced. This view of intrinsic value was quite definite, but it proved almost worthless as a practical matter because neither the average earnings nor the average market price evinced any tendency to be governed by the book value. 

Intrinsic Value and “Earning Power.” Hence this idea was superseded by a newer view, viz., that the intrinsic value of a business was determined by its earning power. But the phrase “earning power” must imply a fairly confident expectation of certain future results. It is not sufficient to know what the past earnings have averaged, or even that they disclose a definite line of growth or decline. There must be plausible grounds for believing that this average or this trend is a dependable guide to the future. Experience has shown only too forcibly that in many instances this is far from true. This means that the concept of “earning power,” expressed as a definite figure, and the derived concept of intrinsic value, as something equally definite and ascertainable, cannot be safely accepted as a general premise of security analysis.

Example: To make this reasoning clearer, let us consider a concrete and typical example. What would we mean by the intrinsic value of J. I. Case Company common, as analyzed, say, early in 1933? The market price was $30; the asset value per share was $176; no dividend was being paid; the average earnings for ten years had been $9.50 per share; the results for 1932 had shown a deficit of $17 per share. If we followed a customary method of appraisal, we might take the average earnings per share of common for ten years, multiply this average by ten, and arrive at an intrinsic value of $95. But let us examine the individual figures which make up this ten-year average. They are as shown in the table on page 66. The average of $9.50 is obviously nothing more than an arithmetical resultant from ten unrelated figures. It can hardly be urged that this average is in any way representative of typical conditions in the past or representative of what may be expected in the future. Hence any figure of “real” or intrinsic value derived from this average must be characterized as equally accidental or artificial.

Skärmavbild 2015-05-19 kl. 22.22.25

Skärmavbild 2015-05-19 kl. 22.42.18

TBR: Kopparberg Brewery

Kopparberg Brewery: Company Information

Kopparberg Brewery is a family run business, owned and managed by the Bronsman brothers, Peter and Dan-Anders. The brewery still stands on the original site where it was built over 130 years ago. Generations of local families have worked for Kopparberg over the years and to this day it remains the main source of employment for the town’s 4,000 people. The town itself is located in central Sweden, just over a two-hour drive from Stockholm.

Kopparberg Brewery was re-established in 1994, when Peter Bronsman and his brother Dan-Anders Bronsman bought the old brewery in the town of Kopparberg, Sweden. 36 regional brewers originally founded it in 1882. Kopparberg is now sold in more than 30 countries and is the world’s best-selling pear cider. Kopparberg is listed in Sweden on the NGM Nordic MTF. (Source: Kopparberg Company Presentation 2014)

K2_1Revenues, Products and Markets

Kopparberg has shown a rapid growth during the last 20 years. Revenues grew from 46 MSEK in 1994/95 to 2 403 MSEK in 2013, a compounded annual growth (CAGR) rate of 21.9%. Click image below to enlarge. The CAGR in revenues between 2004-2013 was 10.2%.

K3

Revenue Breakdown 2013 (SEK, million)
Sweden 549.8 34.2%
EU 991.1 61.6%
Rest of the World 68.5 4.3%
1,609.4 100.0%

The annual report for 2013 (see here for annual report in Swedish, there is no English version) does not provide a breakdown of revenues per product line.

Kopparberg’s products at the moment are (Source: Kopparberg Company Presentation 2014):

  • Kopparberg Premium Cider
  • Sofiero (beer)
  • Zeunert’s Premium Beer
  • Fagerhult Export (beer)
  • Dufvemåla (bottled water)
  • Gammaldags Svagdricka
  • Frank’s Vodka
  • Richard’s Dry Gin

K1According the Kopparberg itself:

  • Kopparberg Cider is the best selling Pear Cider in the world.
  • Sofiero Original is the best selling beer for the 11th year running at Systembolaget (the Swedish monopolist).

One third of the revenues (549.8 MSEK) comes from Sweden, sales in EU make up about 62% and about 4% comes from sales in the rest of the world.

Return on Capital: Magic Formula

Amounts in SEK millions.
Fiscal year 2013.
Kopparbergs
(KOBR MTF B)
Return on Capital 33.5%
EBIT 129.
Net Fixed Assets 404.0
Net Working Capital -19.0
Current Assets 758.0
Current Liabilities 776.0
Excess Cash (>5%) 0.0
Drivers of Return on Capital
EBIT-margin, % 8.0%
× Invested Capital, turns 4.2
= Return on Capital 33.5%
Earnings Yield 7.6%
EBIT 129.0
Enterprise Value 1,696.0
   Market Capitalization 1,432.0
   Debt 263.0
   Excess Cash 0.0

See graph below for a comparison of return on capital and return on equity.

KD2Profitability, Book Value and Dividend

Profit margins have improved during the last ten years, see graph below.

KD3Book value per share has shown a CAGR of 10.4%, amounting to 5.04 SEK in 2004 compared to 12.60 SEK in 2013.

Dividend per share was 1.90 SEK in 2013 compared to 0.15 SEK in 2004, a CAGR of 32.6%. The payout ratio in 2013 was 54.9%, compared to a ten-year average of 53.8%.

KD4Earnings & Cash Flow

Net income grew from 5.7 MSEK 2004 to 71.3 MSEK in 2013, a compounded annual growth (CAGR) rate of 32.5%. Earnings per share (no dilution) in 2013 was 3.46 SEK, compared to 0.27 SEK in 2004, a CAGR of 32.5%.

Free cash flow grew from 18.0 MSEK 2004 to 61.9 MSEK in 2013, a compounded annual growth (CAGR) rate of 14.7%. Free cash flow per share (no dilution) in 2013 was 3.00 SEK, compared to 0.87 SEK in 2004, a CAGR of 14.7%. During the last ten years Kopparberg has invested a lot in capital expenditures to support the revenue growth.

KD1Trailing twelve months (TTM) earnings per share was 3.89 SEK.

Valuation: Quick & Dirty

If we assume an earning power between 3 to 4 SEK per share together with an earnings multiplier range of 15 to 25 times, we get a range of intrinsic business value per share of 45-100 SEK.

Intrinsic Business Value per Share Range
Earning Power 15x 20x 25x
3 SEK/share 45 60 75
4 SEK/share 60 80 100
Price per share 70
Low end High End
Margin of safety -35,7% 14,3%

For the time being, until further research has been done, let’s say a reasonable earning power equals the TTM EPS of 3.89 SEK, and an earnings multiplier of 20 times to be a fair one. This gives an intrinsic value of 77.8 SEK.

Kopparberg will be added to the watch list.

To be researched (TBR)

Some things, among others, to be further researched are:

  • Revenues per product line
  • Competitors and industry characteristics
  • Business risks
  • Capital expenditures
  • Cost structure
  • Financial leverage

Disclosure: I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company or individual mentioned in this article. I have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. This article is informational and is in my own personal opinion. Always do your own due diligence and contact a financial professional before executing any trades or investments.

Lundbergs

Lundbergs: A Swedish Investment Company

LLogo1

Lundbergs (STO:LUND-B) is an investment company that manages and develops a number of companies based on active, long-term ownership.

The asset portfolio includes:

  • The wholly owned real estate company Fastighets AB LE Lundberg
  • The publicly traded subsidiaries Hufvudstaden and Holmen
  • The associated companies Indutrade and Husqvarna
  • Lundbergs also has major shareholdings in Industrivärden, Handelsbanken, Sandvik and Skanska

Lundbergs’ objective is to generate a return on invested capital over time that substantially exceeds the yield on a risk-free interest-bearing investment.

L3Lundbergs’ History

Since this is the first time that I look at Lundbergs, I have included their own text about their history (Source: Lundbergs).

In 1944, when Lars Erik Lundberg was only 24, he formed the company that was later to become Lundbergs in his apartment in Norrköping. This company engaged in construction operations and focused on residential building. From an early stage, Lars Erik aimed to master the entire building process from land acquisition to finished product, a full-service construction business.

Geographically, business activities were established in many locations throughout central and southern Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s. During the same period, the construction operations also expanded to include office buildings and department stores.

At an early stage, Lars Erik Lundberg started to show an interest in investing in proprietary properties, having understood the value represented by expansion into an additional business sector, real estate management. This move created greater stability in the Company, which could gradually reduce its dependence on construction operations. It is this foundation upon which Fastighets AB L E Lundberg’s property operations rest today. Since the end of the 1950s, the property holdings have grown successively, and now consist almost entirely of proprietary properties. Apart from residential properties, the holdings also include commercial properties for retail activities and offices.

At the end of the 1970s, Lundbergs began to consider a further expansion of the Group’s operations and, during the 1980s, a series of investments were made within new industries. Finance companies were acquired and developed, as were several smaller industrial companies. Investments were also made in certain publicly listed companies, which gradually resulted in several major shareholdings in such companies as Incentive, Holmens Bruk, Alfa Laval, Siab and Östgöta Enskilda Bank. The Group’s operations became increasingly diversified and, during the second half of the 1980s, it was decided that investments outside the core area of construction and real estate operations would be concentrated in a limited number of publicly listed companies. Other operations were divested and, in the early 1990s, major shareholdings in Alfa Laval and Incentive were sold to Tetra Pak and ASEA, respectively. These structural transactions meant that significant capital was released, thus strengthening the capital base considerably.

In 1983, the shares in Lundbergs, with Fredrik Lundberg as President, were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. From its original status as a wholly owned family company, the step was now fully taken into the glare of the public eye. However, the Lundberg family retained a clear majority holding in the Company.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden was afflicted by what was commonly called the finance crisis. As the principal owner of Östgöta Enskilda Bank, Lundbergs was hit heavily by this crisis. However, the bank was saved as a result of very substantial capital investments from Lundbergs. In 1997, the Östgöta Enskilda Bank was sold to Danske Bank at a healthy gain.

In 1994, the construction operations were transferred to the associated company Siab, which merged with NCC in 1997. During the 1990s and to date in the 2000s, substantial investments have been made and Lundbergs has become the principal owner of Holmen and Hufvudstaden. Lundbergs has also been the principal owner of Cardo since 1998. All of the holdings were divested in March 2011. Lundbergs also has major shareholdings in Handelsbanken, Husqvarna, Industrivärden, Indutrade and Sandvik.

Accordingly, during its first 65 years, Lundbergs has developed from a construction company to an investment company with interests in several different areas.

Ownership

Fredrik Lundberg is the largest owner of Lundbergs with a share capital of 54.6% and voting rights of 89.9%. Together with his wife, Anne-Marie Lundberg, and his daughters, Louise Lindh and Karina Martinson, he controls 69.6% of the share capital and 93.4% of the voting rights.

L8Dividends and Book Value

Dividend per share in 2013 was 4.60 SEK, compared to 4.30 SEK in 2012. Dividend yield was 1.7% at year-end 2013, and 1.9% in 2012. See image below for historical development. L11Net asset value at year-end 2013 and 2012 was 42,771 and 37,501 million SEK respectively, or 345 and 302 SEK per share. See image below for historical development. L12Lundbergs Net Asset Value

Lundbergs owns shares in the following Swedish listed companies:

  • Handelsbanken (Bank)
  • Holmen (Paper & Paper Products)
  • Hufvudstaden (Real Estate)
  • Husqvarna (Tools & Accessories)
  • Industrivärlden (Investment Company)
  • Industrade (Industrial Distribution)
  • Skanska (Engineering & Construction)

Lundbergs also owns 100% of Fastighets AB Lundbergs, a real estate company.

Click image below to increase the size (Source: Lundbergs, Q2 2014).

As of June 30, 2014 Lundbergs net asset value after deferred tax was 46.6 billion SEK, or 376 SEK per share, an increase of 9.0% compared to December 31, 2013, and a net asset value of 24.8 billion SEK, or 345 SEK per share.

The table shows that stocks in Holmen, Hufvudstaden, Industrivärlden and Handelsbanken make up 57% of the total stock portfolio. No single investment is below 5% of the portfolio, except for the Other shares category.

L10 Look-Through Earnings

In the table below I have tried to estimate a reasonable earning power for each individual holding in the stock portfolio, and for the wholly-owned real estate business Fastighets AB L E Lundbergs.

The estimate of earning power is a rough guess of what I think might be considered reasonable. The assessment is based on earnings data from the annual reports filed by those companies.

Company Share Capital Voting Rights Earning Power* Lundbergs’ Share*
June 30, 2014 [2] [1]×[2]
[1]
Industrivärlden 11,6% 17,5% 3 830 444
Hufvudstaden 45,3% 88,1% 850 385
Fastighets AB
L E Lundberg
100,0% 100,0% 400 400
Handelsbanken 2,0% 2,0%** 13 500 211
Holmen 32,9% 61,6% 800 263
Skanska 3,9% 11,9% 4 500 176
Indutrade 23,8% 23,8% 550 131
Sandvik 2,4% 2,4%** 6 500 122
Husqvarna 7,6% 23,6% 1100 84
Admin. aft. tax -23,4*** -23,4
Earning Power, total: 2 191
Earning Power per Share: 17,7
Earnings Multiplier, 15 times 265,1
Price per Share: 291,2
Earnings Yield, %: 6,1%
Margin of Safety -9,0%

*Amounts in million SEK except per share data.
**Taxable for Lundbergs. Amount reduced with current tax rate of 22.0%.
***Amount of 30 million SEK for personnel expense and other, reduced with 22.0% for taxes. Taken from the FY2013 parent company financial statement.

From the table above and the estimated earning power of each business, the composition of earnings is shown in the chart below. Top three and five investments make up about 55% and 77% respectively of the total.

LEC1From the calculation in the table above we see that Lundbergs’ earning power per share is about 17.7 SEK per share. Applying an earnings multiplier of 15 times gives an intrinsic business value per share of 265 SEK, compared to price per share of 291 SEK, and thus a negative margin of safety of 9%.

Lundbergs will be added to the watch list.

Disclosure: I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company or individual mentioned in this article. I have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. This article is informational and is in my own personal opinion. Always do your own due diligence and contact a financial professional before executing any trades or investments.